Secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve efficiency and increase access to credit. In part, this is because of their greater ability to manage risk. However, the degree to which secondary markets expand access to credit is virtually unknown. Using the mortgage market as an example, we begin to fill that gap. Our conceptual model suggests that secondary credit markets have potentially ambiguous effects on interest rates, but unambiguous positive effects on the number of loans issued. We focus our empirical analysis on the latter using 1992-2004 HMDA files for conventional, conforming, home purchase loans in conjunction with Census tract data.
1.

Introduction
Secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve efficiency because of their greater ability to manage risk, enhance liquidity, and arbitrage regional imbalances in the supply and demand for credit. Although in principle these features should result in greater access to credit, the magnitude of such effects is largely unknown and has only rarely been studied. 1 That lack of information is striking, especially in light of recent dramatic expansion of the secondary market for mortgages. This paper begins begin to fill that gap.
Between 1992 and 2002, secondary market purchases of conventional home purchase (CHP) loans boomed, rising from 71 to 93 percent of CHP originations (see Table 1 ).
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Expansion of secondary market activity has been even more dramatic among low-income and minority neighborhoods. Among low-income communities, purchases jumped from 33 percent of originations in 1992 to 81 percent in 2002; over this same period, among predominantly African American and Hispanic neighborhoods, the ratio of purchases to originations jumped by roughly 38 and 40 percentage points, respectively (see Table 1 ). This rapid increase in secondary market activity provides an opportunity to study the impact of secondary credit markets in general and the mortgage market in particular.
The rapid growth in the secondary mortgage market has been facilitated by policies and institutions largely put into place by the federal government over the past 40 years. Most notable, those efforts include the establishment of government and government-sponsored secondary mortgage market enterprises (GSEs), the most prominent of which are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 3 Investors in the mortgage-backed securities of the GSEs attribute an "implicit" U.S. Government guarantee to those securities. In 2002, the GSEs accounted for roughly 60 percent of secondary market purchases of conventional home purchase loans.
Moreover, the GSE charters mandate that these institutions enhance the supply of credit to lowincome, minority, and other underserved communities. Despite this extensive level of government involvement, there is a stunning lack of evidence on the impact of secondary markets on access to credit.
The belief that secondary markets enhance efficiency is based on scale economies: a large secondary market can increase liquidity in the funding of mortgages, arbitrage regional imbalances in the supply and demand for credit, and more effectively manage risk associated with lending outcomes. Of these mechanisms, our focus will be on risk. In Section 2, a simple conceptual model is presented in which loan rates clear the market. Under those conditions, an active secondary market lowers lending rates and systematic denials of loan applications do not occur. In practice, however, 16 percent of conventional home purchase mortgage loan applications are denied (see Table 1 ). If those denials arise because lenders sometimes make mistakes and deny profitable loans, or borrowers occasionally apply for credit that they clearly cannot afford, then the basic supply-demand model prevails. However, if denials arise because of concerns about moral hazard and adverse selection that exacerbate interest rate and default 3 Fannie Mae was initially an agency of the U.S. Government, created in 1938 to make a secondary market in FHA mortgages. In 1968, Fannie Mae became a federally-chartered GSE owned solely by private investors, the primary role of which was to provide lenders with a ready market for their mortgage assets and to assist in promoting uniformly defined mortgage instruments. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to make a secondary market in the non-FHA mortgages originated by the savings and loan associations. In addition to establishing these GSEs, the Federal government has also facilitated the creation of loan insurance programs, helped to standardize mortgage loan instruments and underwriting, and enhanced the availability of hazard and title insurance.
risk, then arguments based on the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of equilibrium credit rationing imply a different set of outcomes.
As outlined by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , when borrowers display observable differences in risk attributes, competitive markets will charge higher risk borrowers higher loan rates. Such risk-based pricing has become increasingly common in the mortgage market with the emergence of "prime" versus "sub-prime" lending, and has been the longstanding practice in markets for commercial and industrial loans. But Stiglitz and Weiss further point out that under certain market conditions, the highest risk group to receive credit (e.g. sub-prime) may be subject to equilibrium credit rationing. When we extend the simple supply-demand model to allow for this possibility, the impact of secondary markets on loan rates in the sub-prime sector is ambiguous.
On the other hand, regardless of whether loan rates clear the market, an active secondary market has an unambiguous positive effect on the share of loan applications that are originated. Partly for that reason, the primary focus of our empirical work is to measure the extent to which secondary market activity increases mortgage origination rates.
Summary measures based on data provided by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) provide a first indication of the relationship between secondary market activity and access to credit. In Table 1 , notice that in 2002, those MSAs with the lowest conventional home purchase (CHP) loan application denial rates (denials divided by the number of applications) had unusually high levels of secondary market purchases relative to originations, and vice-versa.
Clearly, increased secondary market activity is strongly correlated with improved access to mortgage credit.
As implicitly suggested in Table 1 , we base our analysis on a largely overlooked feature of the HMDA data. Specifically, HMDA provides detailed information on secondary market purchases of mortgage loans. But with the exception of a few early studies (see, for example, Canner and Gabriel (1993) , Bunce and Scheessele (1996 ), Manchester, Neal and Bunce (1998 ), and Bunce (2002 ), HMDA information on secondary market loan purchases has been virtually ignored. Instead, researchers and regulators have largely utilized HMDA data to analyze primary market lender accept/reject decisions of loan applications. 4 These studies have typically focused on the role of applicant race and ethnicity with corresponding implications for discrimination and fair lending practices. Although these studies have been influential, they also have been controversial. This is because of well known limitations of HMDA: the data do not provide information on loan applicant wealth and credit history; however, those controls are critical to lender assessments of borrower credit worthiness in the accept/reject decision.
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Our study avoids the limitations of the HMDA data while drawing on its strengths. This is because secondary market purchase decisions are not based on the attributes of the individual borrowers. Instead, secondary market purchasers consider the broad features of loan pools that trade in the secondary market. The GSEs, for example, largely purchase pools of conventional loans that conform to their loan size and underwriting guidelines. That information is available in the HMDA data. In addition, while secondary market purchase decisions are often influenced by neighborhood socioeconomic (SES) attributes -indeed, GSE regulations require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase a share of their loans in low-income and minority communities -4 See, for example, Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1994), Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney (1996) , Avery, Beeson, and Calem (1997 ), Huck (2001 ), and Dietrich (2002 .
5 As a result, early accept/reject studies that did not control for borrower wealth and credit history created a virtual firestorm of debate. In response to those concerns, Munnell et al (1996) supplemented HMDA records in Boston with analysis of individual-level loan files, which included information on borrower wealth and credit scores as well as other borrower-level determinants of loan performance. Results from that study confirmed that minorities in Boston were more likely to have their loan applications rejected than comparable white mortgage applicants. Other studies using HMDA data have focused on subprime lending in low-income markets (see, for example, Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies (2002)), or the share of primary market originations that are documented in the HMDA data (see, for example, Berkovec and Zorn (1996), FFIEC (1996) ).
that information may be obtained from the decennial Census. Combining HMDA and Census data, we are able to bring to bear much of the information used by secondary institutions when deciding whether to purchase loans from primary market lenders.
Nevertheless, challenges remain. Most important, our conceptual model suggests that key measures of mortgage market activity (originations, applications, denials, and purchases) are simultaneously determined. To address that concern, in the origination share regressions we instrument in two ways for endogenous secondary market purchases. First, we instrument for purchases using the "underserved" status of the census tract as defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development: specifically, whether tract median income is less than 90 percent of area (MSA) median income, or AMI. As HUD requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase over 30 percent of their loans in such tracts, this measure provides an exogenous policy-induced motive for secondary market purchases. The main limitation associated with the use of underserved tract status as an instrument is that tract income affects demand and supply for credit as well. To address that issue, we include a long list of tract SES attributes from 1990
(coded to year-2000 tract geography) in all of our models, including tract average income and income squared. 6 It is through the discrete change in tract status upon passing the 90 percent AMI income threshold that we gain our identification.
In a second IV approach, we estimate the origination share models using 1980 SES attributes of the census tracts (coded to year-2000 tract geography Among lenders that specialize in high risk subprime loans, the analogous figure is 10.9 percent, somewhat smaller than for the market overall because of the lesser scale of sub-prime activity in the secondary market. 7 At the margin, however, secondary market purchases in the subprime sector increase origination rates by an amount 3 to 10 times larger than for the market overall.
The larger marginal impact of secondary markets on high-risk segments of the mortgage market suggests the importance of the secondary market to risk management and to the extension of credit to underserved population groups.
As a final set of exercises, note that if mortgage markets are well-functioning, then primary lenders should not deny loans that could profitably be sold into the secondary market, and denials should have no effect on secondary market purchases. 8 We estimate this relationship to provide further background evidence on the operation of the mortgage market. Note, however, that because underserved tract status is a determinant of secondary market activity we cannot use underserved status as an instrument. Instead, for the purchase regressions, we estimate using the 1980 SES variables as instruments, and also the non-IV model. In both the non-IV and IV models, for most years, denials had small effects on purchases. Along with evidence that secondary markets increase originations, these patterns confirm that an active secondary market improves the efficiency with which mortgage credit is provided, and in so doing, increases access to credit.
To clarify these and other results, we proceed as follows. Section 2 develops the conceptual model used to clarify the impact of secondary market activity on primary market outcomes. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and model. Sections 4 and 5 report on data and estimation results and Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual Model
The goal of this section is to clarify two key features of the analysis. First, and most important, how does an active secondary market affect the share of loan applications that are originated in the primary market and hence the availability of credit? Second, to what extent do loan denials in the primary market affect secondary market purchases? As will become apparent, these questions are related. Each is considered in turn, beginning with the first.
The influence of secondary market purchases on the primary market
As suggested in the Introduction, it is widely believed that an active secondary market for mortgage credit improves efficiency and expands the supply of loanable funds. This occurs in part because scale economies associated with the secondary market enhance opportunities to manage various sources of risk. 9 As an example, local house price declines, employment shocks, or natural disasters could prove catastrophic to local lenders if they held large stocks of mortgages in portfolio. But those risks are greatly mitigated in the secondary market because of its enhanced ability to diversify investments across regions and loan types.
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Consider now a stylized model of the primary market for mortgage credit in which all markets are competitive and markets clear in equilibrium. The model is portrayed in the four quadrant diagram in Figure 1 . In the upper right quadrant, loan demand varies with the attributes of the local population (Z) including credit history, income, and other socio-economic factors that influence housing preferences. Loan demand also declines with an increase in the mortgage interest rate in the usual way. Loan supply increases with the mortgage rate and is sensitive to the risk-free cost of funds (c), prepayment and default risk that are sensitive both to economywide shocks and the attributes of the applicant pool (Z), and the presence of the secondary market. The manner in which these factors affect the supply of credit is clarified below.
Suppose first that lenders face no risk of any kind. Under those conditions, in the lower right quadrant of Figure 1 , the expected return or yield to holders of mortgage credit is the mortgage interest rate. This is shown by the 45 degree line. It should also be emphasized that this is an accounting relationship -equilibrium features of the market will be dealt with in the upper right quadrant.
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Consider next the influence of economy-wide shocks such as uncertainty about future interest rate paths. As is well known, increases in market rates above the loan contract rate erode the value of outstanding debt. Sufficient declines in interest rates, however, prompt refinance activity whereby existing debt is prepaid at lower current market rates. Holders of mortgage debt, therefore, suffer when rates rise but do not benefit in a corresponding manner when rates fall. For this reason, interest rate volatility is costly to lenders, and this is commonly referred to as interest rate risk. Moreover, it is well documented that interest rates are more volatile when rate levels are high. Accordingly, lender costs associated with interest rate risk increase with the loan rate, and this causes the return (yield) function in the lower right quadrant of the diagram to bend up and away from the 45 degree line.
Consider now the influence of borrower attributes (Z) on default and prepayment risk,
where the latter includes refinance activity as above and also the propensity of borrowers to move and prepay their loans. 12 Moreover, it is realistic to assume that lenders have only imperfect information about Z. Under these conditions, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others argue that as loan rates increase, adverse selection and moral hazard erode the quality of the loan applicant pool. For example, higher rates may skew the applicant pool towards individuals who are more prone to refinance. That is because at higher loan rates individuals who tend not to refinance perceive increasing borrowing costs and disproportionately drop out of the applicant pool (an adverse selection effect). Analogously, higher rates may encourage borrowers to purchase homes in areas subject to greater house price volatility (with greater potential capital gains and loses), or perhaps to seek higher initial loan-to-value ratios, both of which increase the likelihood of default (a moral hazard effect). These effects are costly to lenders, increase with 12 Default, of course, is costly to lenders, as is prepayment risk.
the loan rate, and further bend upwards the return function in the lower right quadrant of the figure.
Suppose now that a secondary market is introduced. Because the secondary market manages risk more effectively, this reduces the cost of the above sources of risk and rotates the return function back down towards the 45 degree line. In the lower left quadrant, as the expected yield on loans increases, the number of loans supplied increases. Moving clockwise around the diagram, the supply of credit in the upper right quadrant takes on a concave shape, and is sensitive to the risk free cost of funds (c), economy-wide shocks, the level of risk associated with a given pool of applicants, and the presence of the secondary market. Moreover, it is clear that the presence of the secondary market causes the loan supply function to rotate up, increasing the supply of loanable funds for any given mortgage rate. In equilibrium, this causes market interest rates to fall from r* to r** and the number of loans originated to rise from L* to L**: because secondary markets manage risk more efficiently, loan rates fall and originations rise.
The simple model just outlined is instructive, but incomplete. In particular, summary measures in Table 1 indicate that in 2004 roughly 16 percent of conventional home purchase mortgage applications were denied. However, if all markets clear in equilibrium in the manner described in Figure 1 , there is no room for denials. We consider this issue next.
Denials of mortgage loan applications
Two very different mechanisms may generate the denials of loans applications observed in Table 1 . The first is simply that borrowers and primary lenders sometimes make mistakes.
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To be precise, borrowers may sometimes mistakenly apply for loans that would not be profitable to originate, and lenders may sometimes mistakenly deny loans that could have been profitable to originate. Under these conditions, the model in Figure 1 remains viable, at least as an approximation.
A second very different explanation for loan denials is that lenders systematically ration credit through terms other than the interest rate. To model this idea we draw upon section IV (p.
406) of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . As a starting point, suppose that loan applicants can be grouped according to observable differences in credit risk. Then competitive lenders would charge higher rates to higher risk groups to compensate for the higher expected costs of late loan payments, refinancing, default, and the like. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, risk-based pricing has become increasingly prevalent in the U.S. mortgage market, including the emergence of "prime" and "sub-prime" lending, the latter of which entails more risk. Moreover, Stiglitz and Weiss argue that whereas the highest risk group to receive credit may be subject to equilibrium credit rationing, lower risk groups are not. We will clarify the intuition behind the Stiglitz-Weiss result below. For now, note that their result suggests that Figure 1 is likely a good approximation of the market for prime lending in the mortgage market, but not necessarily for the sub-prime sector. With this in mind, the discussion below focuses on the sub-prime portion of the mortgage market, the highest risk group to receive mortgage credit.
We consider two cases. In the first case, the secondary market is not present but credit rationing may occur. This is portrayed in Figure 2a . The key difference from Figure 1 is in the lower right quadrant. Observe that the expected rate of return on the pool of loans issued initially increases with the mortgage interest rate, reaches a peak, and then declines with further increases in the mortgage rate. This hump-shaped pattern is a central to the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. In our context, the pattern owes its form to the assumption that as mortgage interest rates increase, interest rate risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard become so costly that the expected yield on loans issued begins to decline. Tracing through to the upper right quadrant, the hump-shaped return function causes mortgage supply to be hump-shaped as well.
Two possibilities now arise. In the first case, demand intersects supply on the upward sloping portion of the supply curve. In this case, all loan applications are accepted and no loans are denied. In the second, demand intersects supply on the downward sloping portion of the supply curve. In this case, relative to the market clearing interest rate (r*), lenders can do better by lowering the mortgage rate so as to increase the number of loans originated. As shown in the lower right quadrant, this would raise the expected rate of return on loans issued. Moreover, this will continue until mortgage rates are reduced to r**, a level equal to the peak in the mortgage supply function. It is worth emphasizing that at r**, the equilibrium mortgage interest rate, excess demand for funds is present in the marketplace and lenders deny some of the loan applications received.
Consider now why the description above may apply to the sub-prime sector but is not likely to hold for the prime segment of the mortgage market. As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , one must assume that the peak in the loan supply function for the high-risk group is associated with a lower expected return (yield) relative to the corresponding peak for the low-risk group.
That would be consistent with the classification of loan applicants into low-and high-risk categories. Suppose now that sub-prime borrowers receive loans and are subject to credit rationing. As above, they would be charged loan rates associated with the peak in their loan supply function. The same would be true for prime borrowers if they too were subject to credit rationing. But if both groups were subject to credit rationing, lenders would profit by diverting loans from sub-prime borrowers to prime loan applicants that had been denied. With competitive markets, therefore, it is likely that only the highest risk group to receive credit is exposed to credit rationing, and Figure 2a applies to just the sub-prime sector.
14 In Figure 2b , we assume now that credit rationing is present and add in the secondary mortgage market. As before, the secondary mortgage market increases the expected rate of return for any given mortgage rate, and this causes the loan supply function in the upper right quadrant to rotate up. As a result, unambiguously, denials of loan applications are reduced while loan originations increase. Interestingly, however, equilibrium mortgage interest rates could in principle either fall or rise.
Testable implications of an active secondary market
The arguments above suggest that secondary markets have an ambiguous effect on mortgage interest rates in the high-risk sector and this complicates efforts to assess the efficiency gains associated with an active secondary market. 15 On the other hand, secondary markets have unambiguous positive effects on loan originations in all segments of the mortgage market. For that reason, in the empirical work to follow, our primary focus will be on measuring the extent to which an active secondary market increases the share of mortgage applications that are originated. Moreover, drawing upon the discussion above, there is good reason to expect that secondary market effects on originations would be greatest in the sub-prime segment of the market; this will be tested.
14 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for further details of this argument.
15 Lehnart, Passmore, and Sherlund (2005) ), for example, find that GSE portfolio purchases and MBS issuance have negligible effects on mortgage interest rate spreads. Lehnart et al (2005) further finds that purchases are not more effective than securitization in reducing mortgage interest rate spreads. Findings from both studies, however, could be obscured by differential interest rate effects from secondary market activity.
Our discussion above also implicitly suggests a second set of tests that are potentially revealing. Specifically, if primary lenders only deny loans that the secondary market could not profitably manage, then such denials should not affect the number of loans purchased by the secondary market. 16 On the other hand, if primary lenders sometimes mistakenly deny loans that the secondary market would have purchased, those denials should reduce secondary market purchases. Hence, evidence that denials have small effects on secondary market purchases would be suggestive that primary lenders are cognizant of their opportunities to profitably sell loans to the secondary market, thereby achieving a more efficient outcome. 
Empirical Model
Origination regression
Our empirical work is guided by the relationships outlined in Figures 1 through 2b .
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that prime (low-risk) and sub-prime (high-risk)
segments of the market may be segmented and subject to different equilibrium loan rates.
Bearing that in mind, in the discussion below, we develop our estimating equations for the most general case that allows for the possibility of credit rationing.
We begin by recognizing that originations in period t (L t ) equal applications (A t ) minus
16 More generally, any loans originated by primary market lenders must be ones that they want to hold in portfolio or that secondary market investors would want to purchase.
17 A further implication of the model is that denial rates should be higher in the sub-prime sector to the extent that that sector is subject to credit rationing but the prime sector is not. We return to this point later in the paper.
Applications are simply another name for demand and depend on mortgage rates (r t ) and the attributes of the applicant pool (Z t ),
The supply of mortgage credit is sensitive to whether a credit rationing equilibrium prevails, and also the presence of the secondary market,
Note that r max is the mortgage rate associated with the peak of the loan supply function in the upper right quadrant of Figure 2b and r clear is the market clearing rate.
Equilibrium in the market is as described in Figure 2b and depends on whether the loan demand function intersects the supply function at a downward or upward sloping point.
Accordingly, the equilibrium number of loans originated is given by,
The number of loans denied in equilibrium can then be obtained by differencing (3.2) and (3.3)
at the equilibrium mortgage rate,
As noted earlier, in a non-credit rationing equilibrium, markets clear and systematic denials are zero. However, when credit rationing prevails, loan denials equal the difference between A t and L t , as implied by (3.1).
It is also useful to formally recognize that equilibrium mortgage rates depend on all of the arguments of the demand and supply functions,
Thus, equilibrium mortgage rates depend on the risk free cost of funds (c t ), the intensity of secondary market purchase activity, and also the observable characteristics of the loan applicants.
Using these expressions, we seek to analyze the impact of secondary market activity on access to credit. There are two channels by which this occurs. The first is through the effect of secondary market activity on mortgage interest rates as in (3.6). The second channel is through the effect of secondary market activity on loan denials conditional on the mortgage rate, with related implications for originations. The influence of secondary markets on mortgage rates has been the focus of recent work (see Lehnert, Passmore, and Sherland (2005) , for example) and we do not seek to evaluate that relationship here. 18 Instead, as noted earlier, this study focuses on the extent to which secondary market purchases increase the share of applications that are originated. 19 We proceed as follows.
18 In the empirical model to follow, we control for inter-metropolitan variability in mortgage rates by including MSA and MSA size-related fixed effects in the estimating equations. 19 In earlier versions of the paper we experimented with estimating the impact of secondary market activity on denials as opposed to originations. For two reasons, however, we favor the focus on originations. First, there are many more census tracts with zero denials as compared to originations. Focusing on originations therefore reduces the sensitivity to censored dependent variables (Tobit models are used in the estimation nevertheless). Second, and more importantly, our goal is to isolate the impact of secondary markets on access to credit. But some denied applications will be resubmitted to the same or alternate lenders and ultimately be approved. As such, denials overstate the effect of secondary markets on access to credit, whereas originations provide a direct measure of the outcome of primary interest.
In each time period t, the share of loan applications that are originated is given by s, Note that θ MSA,t controls for MSA-wide mortgage rates as well as any other unobserved factors common to census tracts throughout a given MSA (or group of MSAs for the smaller cities).
From the discussion above, local socio-demographic attributes, Z, shift both borrower demand (A) and the lenders' supply of credit by influencing taste for credit and credit risk, respectively. For this reason, the coefficients on Z are reduced form and reflect the influence of both demand and supply factors. In contrast, P does not affect demand, but does influence the 20 In total, 30 such fixed effects were included in the model. These included 24 fixed effects for each of the largest MSAs in the U.S. in 2000 (MSAs with over 500 census tracts), and 6 fixed effects for different size categories of MSAs with fewer than 500 census tracts in 2000.
supply of credit. Our estimate of b 2 , therefore, measures the impact of secondary market activity on the willingness of primary lenders to supply credit and is expected to be positive. 
Purchase regression
As discussed earlier, a further implicit implication of our model is that primary market lenders should deny only those loans that cannot be profitably sold into the secondary market (or held in portfolio). Under these conditions, D should have no effect on P. On the other hand, P is clearly affected by L since L represents the supply of loans potentially available for purchase in the secondary market. Our second estimating equation, therefore, examines the impact of denials on the share of originations purchased by the secondary market. The estimating equation is,
If primary lenders deny loans that could have been profitably sold into the secondary market, then p 1 should be negative. However, with the advent of increasingly effective information technology and the general sophistication of the mortgage market, one would expect such outcomes to be relatively infrequent. If that is the case, then the coefficient on p 1 should be small. 21 Given the structure in (3.10), it is tempting to analyze the impact of Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations on the availability or mortgage credit. CRA, for example, requires that primary market lenders extend credit to underserved neighborhoods, while GSE regulations require that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase a minimum share of their loans from low-income and minority neighborhoods. However, by specifying Z in a very general and reduced form manner, this makes precise interpretation of the coefficients on Z difficult. The payoff is that specifying Z in this manner helps to ensure that Z soaks up unobserved credit risk associated with the applicant pool, and in so doing, allows us to obtain consistent estimates of b 2 , a primary goal of this paper. Partly for that reason, analysis of the influence of CRA and GSE regulations and the GSEs in general is left for a future paper in which a more structured approach is applied to the specification of Z.
Endogenous regressors
A final consideration is that the mortgage market control variables in (3.10) and (3.11) may be endogenous. Accordingly, as outlined in the Introduction, when estimating the origination share regressions we employ two strategies. First, we instrument for purchases using the underserved status of the census tracts. At the same time, we control for a long list of 1990 tract socioeconomic attributes, including average income and average income squared. Second, we estimate the origination share equations using 1980 tract socioeconomic attributes as instruments for endogenous secondary market purchases. 22 This latter approach is also used when estimating the purchase regressions. Strengths and limitations of the two approaches are as described in the Introduction.
Data
Sources and variables
As noted in the Introduction, data for the analysis were obtained from the Home 
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To further clean the data, certain observations were dropped. First, in calculating tractlevel mortgage attributes (e.g. purchases, denials), individual loan records from the HMDA data were dropped if the type or purpose of the loan could not be determined. Second, we retained only conventional, home purchase loan records for which the size of the loan requested was less than the conforming loan limit stipulated by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in each given year.
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Finally, in the empirical work to follow we focus on three sub-sample based on the type of lending institution: (i) all mortgage lending institutions, (ii) lending institutions that specialize in 23 Recall also, as noted in the Introduction, the HMDA data do not provide information on individual loan applicant wealth or credit score (credit history). However, as described earlier, our focus on secondary market behavior largely mitigates this limitation in the data because secondary market purchases are based on broad features of the pooled mortgages rather than on the characteristics of specific borrowers. 24 Results were little changed when we used 1970 tract attributes as instruments instead of 1980 values except that sample sizes were reduced because the geographic coverage of the census tracts was not as complete in 1970. For this reason, we focus on the models that use the 1980 tract attributes as instruments. 25 We thank Glenn Canner in assisting us in identifying the relevant conforming loan size limits.
sub-prime mortgages, 26 and (iii) non-financial institutions, mortgage bankers and brokers. As noted earlier, sub-prime lenders serve higher risk loan applicants and should be especially sensitive to the presence of an active secondary market. Non-financial institutions typically do not hold loans in portfolio and should also be unusually dependent on the secondary market. Table 2 Comparing activity at all lenders (Panel A) to sub-prime specialists (Panel B), in every year, the ratio of denials to applications is sharply higher for sub-prime lenders (e.g., 26 percent versus 16 percent, respectively, in 2004). This is consistent with the higher risk applicants served in the sub-prime segment of the market. The ratio of secondary market purchases to originations is well above 1 for sub-prime specialists (Panel B) in 1996 and 1998, and then drops down to 0.85 in 2004. In part, the values above indicate that some loan originators (e.g. commercial banks) purchase mortgages from other lenders and then re-sell the purchased loans.
Sample Means
Although that practice does not influence the regression work to follow, it inflates the purchase/origination ratios in Panel B. 27 A similar pattern is evident in Panel C for the nonfinancial institutions (Panel C), indicative of the tendency of non-financial institutions (e.g. mortgage brokers) to also purchase and then resell a portion of their mortgages.
Estimation Results
Origination Share of Applications
This section presents estimates of the regression models outlined in Section 3. We begin with the origination share equation, expression (3.10). In all cases, the estimation is based on a Tobit specification that restricts the range of the log of the origination/application ratio to be non-positive. All of the models are estimated three times, first using IV methods treating purchases as endogenous with underserved tract status as the instrument (Table 3a) , again using 1980 SES variables as instruments (Table 3b) , and a third time treating purchases as exogenous. 28 In each case, estimates for each year of the HMDA data (1992-2004, even years) are reported. Wald tests provided in Tables 3a and 3b indicate that the IV estimates typically differ significantly from the corresponding non-IV estimates. In addition, the partial-F tests (also reported in Tables 3a and 3b) indicate that the instruments from both IV strategies are very strong predictors of purchases in the first stage. For reasons outlined in the Introduction, we favor using tract underserved status as the instrument of choice for the origination share regressions, and our discussion below focuses exclusively on Table 3a for that reason. Results from Table 3b (using 1980 SES attributes as instruments) and Table 3c (non-IV models) are qualitatively similar, although the magnitudes of the estimated relationships are generally smaller.
As outlined in section 3, all of the models include MSA fixed effects for the largest MSAs and MSA size fixed effects for size categories associated with the many smaller MSAs.
The models also include a rich set of census tract socioeconomic attributes (Z) that control for unobserved taste and risk factors that influence the demand and supply for credit. Because of the reduced form nature of Z, we do not report the coefficients on those variables. Instead, only the coefficients on secondary market purchases are reported.
Consider now Panel A of Table 3a . This panel reports the estimated influence of secondary market purchases on all lenders. Reading across columns, it is apparent that in each year of the HMDA data, secondary market purchases increase the share of applications originated by primary market lenders. Also apparent is that the estimates decline somewhat over secondary market activity has roughly halved the share of applications that are denied. 29 On the whole, our estimates confirm that an active secondary market has an important impact on access to credit.
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To explore these patterns further, Panel B reports estimates for all lenders based just on those tracts where sub-prime lenders are active, while Panel C reports estimates based on the sub-prime lenders. As before, both panels begin with 1996 given the small size of the sub-prime sector prior to that time.
Notice first in Panel C (sub-prime only) that the coefficient on secondary market purchases in 1996 and 1998 is imprecisely estimated and not significant. That likely reflects the small size of the sub-prime sector at that time. We focus, therefore, on estimates from 2000 on.
Combining the coefficient estimates with the sample means in Table 2 (Panel C), the average impact of secondary market purchases on sub-prime origination shares is 10.9 percent. That estimate is somewhat smaller than for the market overall (e.g. the 15.6 percent figure) owing to the lesser scale of secondary market activity in the sub-prime sector. At the margin, the coefficient estimates in Table 3c make clear that secondary market purchases have a sharply higher impact on the sub-prime sector relative to the entire market: in 2000 and 2002, sub-prime effects are roughly ten times higher and in 2004 roughly 3.5 times higher. These findings provide support for the idea that secondary markets enhance efficiency in part because of their greater ability to manage risk.
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As a further check, we also compare the impact of secondary market purchases on origination shares at non-financial institutions, Panel D. Recall that non-financial institutions 30 Our estimates are also consistent with the sharp increase in homeownership rates observed in the 1990s. 31 The average effect of secondary market activity on sub-prime origination/application ratios for 2000, 2002, and 2004 is roughly 10 percent, somewhat smaller than the average effect on all lenders (15.6 percent) noted above. The smaller average effect on the sub-prime sector reflects the smaller average number of purchases from sub-prime lenders as reported in Table 2 , Panel B. At the margin, however, it is clear that secondary market activity has a sharply higher impact on the subprime sector as noted above.
typically do not hold loans in portfolio, and therefore, are clearly dependent on the secondary market. Once again, results are consistent with priors: in each year, the purchase coefficient for non-financial institutions (Panel D) is positive, significant, and typically of a larger magnitude relative to all lenders (Panel A), but in most years smaller than for sub-prime specialists (Panel C). These findings further confirm that the secondary market helps most those institutions for which the greatest arbitrage opportunities exist. This holds for institutions that largely do not retain loans in portfolio (e.g. non-financial lenders), and also for institutions that have a limited ability to diversify risks associated with their applicant pool (e.g. sub-prime lenders).
Secondary Market Purchases Relative to Originations
As noted earlier, if markets are well functioning, primary lenders should not deny loans that could profitably be sold to secondary market institutions. Under those conditions, denials should have no impact on purchases for any given level of originations. If instead primary lenders sometimes make mistakenly deny loans that could have been profitably sold, then denials should reduce the number of secondary market purchases. Tables 4a and 4b present estimates based on expression (3.11) to examine this question. As before, Tobit models are used, in this case to restrict the range of purchases to be non-negative. IV estimates based on 1980 SES tract attributes are presented in Table 4a while non-IV estimates are provided in Table 4b . Once again, Wald tests (in Table 4a ) confirm that the IV estimates typically differ from the non-IV. In addition, partial F tests confirm that the instruments are strong predictors of denials of loan applications. As before, only the coefficients on the key mortgage market variables are reported.
Also, in each table (Tables 4a and 4b ), Panel A reports results based on all types of primary market lenders, while Panel B reports results based on just those primary market institutions that specialize in sub-prime lending.
Consider now the impact of denials on purchases. In Panel A (all lenders), the estimated coefficient on denials is consistently negative, often insignificant or only weakly significant, and typically of small magnitude. In 2004, for example, the coefficient on denials is -0.00098.
Evaluated at the average number of denials in that year (18.3 as reported in Panel A of Table 2 ), this implies that primary market denials reduced the share of originations purchased on the secondary market by 1.79 percent, a relatively small amount. Analogous measures from alternate years are similarly small in magnitude. These patterns seemingly confirm that primary market lenders are largely cognizant of their opportunities to sell loans to the secondary market.
This result is perhaps anticipated, but nevertheless is necessary if credit markets are to operate in an efficient manner.
Panel B repeats the exercise drawing on just the sub-prime lender specialists. The dominant pattern for this panel is that the coefficients on denials are consistently insignificant, regardless of their magnitude and sign. This could potentially reflect the small size of the subprime sector. However, by 2000, the sub-prime sector had become an important part of the mortgage industry. An alternative explanation is that sub-prime specialist lenders often rely heavily on and hence are highly cognizant of opportunities to sell such loans in the secondary market.
Conclusion
Although secondary markets for credit are widely believed to improve the efficiency with which risk is managed, empirical evidence on this point has been largely absent. This paper begins to fill that gap using the mortgage market as an example. Between 1992 and 2004, the secondary market for mortgage credit expanded dramatically. In addition, beginning in the mid1990s, an active market for high-risk subprime loans began to emerge. Together, these events provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of secondary markets on access to credit.
Our empirical work draws on a largely overlooked feature of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Specifically, HMDA collects information on all secondary market purchases of mortgages. We aggregate these data to the census tract level and combine that However, at the margin, the impact of one additional secondary market loan purchase on CHP origination shares is roughly 3 to 10 times larger in the sub-prime sector than for all CHP lenders.
Results also confirm that in most years, denials of mortgage applications by primary market lenders had small negative effects on secondary market purchases. This is consistent with the notion that primary lenders try not to deny loans that can be profitably sold to the secondary market, a necessary feature of a well functioning market. That pattern is even more evident in the subprime sector, where demand by mortgage investors for subprime mortgage pools expanded markedly over our period of analysis. These findings suggest that subprime lenders are better at denying only those loans that cannot be profitably sold to the secondary market, and this also serves to increase access to credit for high-risk borrowers.
Overall, our results demonstrate that an active secondary market increases access to credit, in part because of its greater ability to manage risk. That finding is important for credit markets in general, and for the mortgage market in particular. Indeed, recent aggressive efforts by the Federal government have sought to expand secondary mortgage market activity in lowincome, minority, and other underserved neighborhoods, areas that are often associated with the presence of higher risk loan applicants. These efforts include, for example, HUD guidelines that oblige Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase over 50 percent of their mortgages in such communities. Our findings suggest that such efforts likely do serve to increase credit availability for residents of those neighborhoods.
As a final perspective, it is important to recognize that while expansion of secondary All models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. b Wald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. All models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. b Wald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. All models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. All models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density. b Wald test of the difference between estimates from the IV and non-IV models. All models include as control variables 1990 census tract measures for % population Hispanic; % population African American; average age of population; % population male; average family income; average family income squared; % population age 25 and over with: no high school, some high school, high school degree, some college; % age 16 and over that are unemployed; % population in poverty; % population female-headed families with childrent; average age of housing stock; % single family detached housing; population density.
